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Abstract 
The principle of solidarity is embedded in the foundations of the European Union 
(EU) legal system and is integral to the very ethos that has made the Union 
possible. However, as Member States struggle with contemporary challenges such 
as high migration flows, terrorism and economic turmoil they have predominantly 
adopted individualist and protectionist strategies which undermine the character 
of the Union. Those strategies include, for instance, building walls and securitising 
internal borders. This contribution argues that solidarity is inextricably linked with 
responsibility. 
Solidarity gives rise to responsibility and is a desired consequence of 
responsibility. Thus, this work suggests that strengthening the binomial of 
solidarity/responsibility is the solution that will create effective practices in 
meeting the humanitarian needs of refugees and sharing burdens between 
Member States. 
The contribution analyses the EU’s commitment to solidarity/responsibility and 
calls for Member States to demonstrate their commitment. Three types of 
Member State solidarity/responsibility are identified: 1) towards refugees 
and migrants, 2) towards fellow countries and 3) towards the EU itself. The 
latter finds its legal foundation in the principle of ‘sincere cooperation’ as 
enshrined in Article 4 (3) TEU and constitutes a means of protecting collective 
interest and precluding unilateral Member State actions that might jeopardize 
the entire EU project. 
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1 Introduction 
 
International migration is an inextricable feature in the story of modern Europe, 
which includes emigration to the colonies, immigration from the colonies and 
migration between European countries, especially during World War II and the 
Balkan conflicts, after the fall of the Communist bloc and as facilitated by the free 
movement project of the European Union.1 More recently, Europe has faced a 
wave of mass migration of people displaced by sustained conflicts and instability 
in the Middle East and in certain African nations.2 Thousands and thousands of 
migrants and asylum seekers are failing to reach their desired destinations safely 
as a result of catastrophic accidents and fatalities,3 and those who arrive in 
Europe often experience poor reception conditions in refugee camps.4 
Xenophobic and anti-immigration campaigns within Member States of the 
European Union have resulted in the closure of internal borders. Populist 
movements and extremist political parties have surged in popularity by evoking 
issues of sovereignty, citizenship and nationality, and by scapegoating migrants 
for the effects of prolonged regimes of economic austerity.5 Politicians and the 
media have fuelled this volatile situation with fear, hostility and resentment 
toward migrants and asylum seekers, not least by constructing ‘an automatic link 
between asylum seekers and terrorism’.6 The consequent intensification of 
                                                          
1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trend 2013 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2013), 
available   at   http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/5399a14f9/unhcr-global-trends-2013 
.html, (last visited 10 July 2017). 
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trend 2013 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2013), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- 
europe-34131911 (last visited 12 August 2015); European Parliament, Tracking European 
Commission priority initiatives in 2015, Number 2, 17 June 2015, available at http://www 
.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/559509/EPRS_BRI%282015%29559509_ EN.pdf 
(last visited 19 November 2016). 
However, data collected by agencies such as Frontex on the number of migrants entering the EU 
might not be completely accurate, available at https://theconversation 
.com/seeing-double-how-the-eu-miscounts-migrants-arriving-at-its-borders-49242 (last visited 16 
October 2015). See also EUROSTAT (EC) Asylum and first time asylum applicants— aggregated data 
for 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ 
index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report (last visited 18 December 2016). 
3 Evidence on all casualties in 2014–15, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ 
may/29/refugee-crisis-13000–people-rescued-in-mediterranean-in-one-week?CMP=share_ 
btn_fb (last visited 31 May 2016); and http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/ 
01/newborn-baby-among-dead-after-shipwrecks-in-mediterranean-libya-coast (last visited 
31 May 2016). 
4 Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/28/greece-refugee-warehouses- not-
fit-for-animals (last visited 29 May 2016). 
5 European Anti-Poverty Network, Migrants in Europe’s Age of Austerity (Brussels: EAPN, 2015), 
available    at    http://www.eapn.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/EAPN-2015-EAPN-migration 
-report-899.pdf (last visited 6 July 2017). 
6 Carr, M., Fortress Europe, Inside the War Against Immigration (London: Hurst Publishers, 2015), p. 
275 ff; Rudiger, A., Prisoners of Terrorism? The Impact of Anti-Terrorism Measures on Refugees and 
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border control mechanisms challenges the integrity of the whole EU project, and 
the basis of that project, which is on the principles of solidarity, dignity and 
equality. The default Dublin rule7 which is the current mechanism in place in 
Europe, generally requires migrants to claim asylum in the EU Member State 
which they first entered.8 Yet, the subsequent refugee status acquired in one 
Member State does not automatically confer free circulation and residence rights 
in another Member State.9 This creates massive distributive imbalances to the 
detriment of the States located at the external borders of the EU. 
 Currently, an impasse has been reached among Member State leaders, whose 
commitments to national interests have led to increasingly isolationist 
immigration policies that neither address the problem nor assist other Member 
States in dealing with it. The imminence and intensity of the current humanitarian 
phenomenon demands solutions which align with the EU’s internal and 
international human rights obligations and are deemed politically and 
economically viable by each of the Member States.10 In pursuit of such solutions, 
and from the position that academic research and participation can contribute to 
their formation, this paper focuses on the twin concepts of ‘solidarity’ and 
‘responsibility’. In the context of asylum and immigration policy, solidarity is 
linked to the concept of fairly sharing responsibility i.e. equitably distributing the 
burdens of the refugee and asylum seeker influx between Member States on the 
basis of their capacities. This research therefore considers solidarity to be 
inextricably linked with responsibility. Solidarity gives rise to responsibility, but it 
is also true to say that enhanced solidarity is a desired consequence of adhering 
to responsibilities. 
 The aim of this work is to investigate whether a renewed commitment to 
solidarity and responsibility can help end the current impasse in Europe by 
facilitating a coordinated and equitable approach to managing the pressures of 
immigration into the EU. More specifically, the paper examines the legal concept 
of solidarity/responsibility as enshrined in the EU Treaties and secondary 
                                                                                                                                                   
Asylum Seekers in Britain (London: Refugee Council, 2007), p. 5, available at 
https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0001/5919/prisoners_of_terrorism.pdf (last visited 28 
June 2017). 
7 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ L180/2013 pp. 31–59 (Dublin III). This Regulation 
replaced Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ L 50, 25.2.2003 (Dublin II). 
8 The system also applies to the UK and Ireland. 
9 Gelatt, J., Schengenandthe Free Movementof People Across Europe (Washington DC: Migration 
Policy Institute, 2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/schengen-and- free-
movement-people-across-europe (last visited 4 March 2016). 
10 Gibney, MJ., ‘Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees’, 93(1), American Political 
Science Review (1999) pp. 169–81, at p. 176. 
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legislation, as well as considers some of the more practical difficulties in applying 
these concepts to the asylum and immigration context in the EU. The lack of 
political will to solve the migration issue and scarcity of cooperation between 
Member States and the EU are argued to be the major obstacles to finding a 
responsible solution to migratory challenges. Accordingly, the paper analyses the 
EU’s commitment to solidarity and calls for faith in the solidarity/ responsibility 
ethos to be reaffirmed within the EU. Three types of Member State 
solidarity/responsibility are identified: towards 1) refugees (and, to a certain 
extent, other migrants), 2) fellow EU countries and 3) the EU itself. It is argued 
that the latter category offers ‘transformative’ opportunities for Europe to 
achieve social justice and shift the focus on values.11 
 
2 The General Principle of Solidarity in EU Law 
 
Solidarity is a complex term with multi-disciplinary facets and meanings. It is used 
in multiple contexts across different disciplines, including sociology, philosophy, 
politics and law. Classical sociologists have argued that society can- not possibly 
exist without solidarity.12 Similarly, political philosophers have considered its 
importance in political discourse.13 Lawyers manage to confer clearer meaning to 
the concept in accordance with particular areas of law; ergo solidarity can be 
applied to social and economic rights or to issues of integration, equality and 
inclusion. 
 It is no exaggeration to claim that solidarity has played a central role in the EU 
legal system since its very beginning, and the principle still shapes its structure 
today. In the EU framework, the strength of the principle of solidarity lies in its 
legal connotation; it is included in the Treaties and is also part of the general 
principles of Union law.14 The multifarious functions embedded in this concept 
make it difficult to determine the exact legal status of the corresponding 
principle;15 its meaning depends on the context in which it is used.16 
                                                          
11 Garavoglia, M., How Europe Could Turn the Migrant Crisis into a Win for Itself (Washington DC: 
Brookings, 2015), available at http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/ 
posts/2015/12/21-europe-refugee-crisis-win-garavoglia (last visited 23 December 2015). 
12 Durkheim, E., The Division of Labour in Society (London: Palgrave, 1893); Simmel, G., 
Sociology: Investigations on the Forms of Sociation (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1908). 
13 Habermas, J., ‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism’, 92(3) Journal of Philosophy (1995) pp. 109–131. 
14 Thielemann, E., ‘Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European 
Union’, 16(3) Journal of Refugee Studies (2003) p. 263; Wellens, ‘Revisiting Solidarity as a 
(Re)Emerging Constitutional Principle: Some Further Reflections’, in Wolfum and Kojima (Eds.) 
Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law (Berlin- Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), p. 20. See 
also Case Commission v. Italy (ECJ 1973, p. 102); Commission v. Great Britain 128/78 (ECJ 1978, p. 
419). 
15 Casolari, F., ‘EU Loyalty After Lisbon: An Expectation Gap to Be Filled?’, in: L.S. Rossi & F. Casolari 
(Eds.), The EU after Lisbon Amending or Coping with the Existing Treaties? (Cham: Springer, 2014), 
p. 120. 
16 Morgese, G., ‘Solidarietà e ripartizione degli oneri in materia di asilo nell’Unione europea’, in: G. 
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 The focus of this paper is thus limited to its applications within migration law 
and policy. It emerges clearly from primary and secondary legislation that 
although solidarity has been used in different areas of law, neither the judiciary 
nor EU political institutions have provided a definition of the term. The Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has affirmed that ‘failure in the duty of 
solidarity accepted by Member States by the fact of their adherence to the 
Community [now Union] strikes at the fundamental basis of the Community legal 
order’.17 The Court has also linked this concept to the principle of sincere 
cooperation or loyalty.18 
 Fundamental to the process of European integration, solidarity has been 
recognized since the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, which stated that 
‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single, general plan. It will 
be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity 
(…)’ (emphasis added).19 This type of solidarity was the basis for the creation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) in 1957. 
 In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) stated in its 
Preamble that Member States aimed ‘to deepen the solidarity between their 
peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions’. Then, 
‘solidarity between Member States’ was included as one of the community 
objectives in Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC).20 
Following the refugee crisis in the Balkans in 1990, a first reference to ‘burden 
sharing’ was made by EU ministers responsible for asylum and immigration at 
their meetings of 30 November and 1 December 1992.21 The concept was 
subsequently inserted into the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam in relation to asylum 
                                                                                                                                                   
Caggiano (Ed.), I Percorsi Giuridici Per L’integrazione. Migranti e titolari di protezione internazionale 
tra diritto dell’Unione e ordinamento italiano (Turin: Giappichelli Editore 2014) at p. 370. 
17 See Case 39/72 Commission v. Italy, ECR [1973] 101, para 24; Case 128/78 Commission 
v. Great Britain, ECR [1978], 419, para 12). For further detail on this point see Ross, M., ‘Solidarity—
A New Constitutional Paradigm for the EU?’, in: M. Ross and Y. Borgmann- Prebil (Eds.), Promoting 
Solidarity in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 39–40; McDonough, P. 
& E. Tsourdi, Putting solidarity to the test: assessing Europe’s response to the asylum crisis in 
Greece, Research Paper 231 (Geneva: UNHCR 2012), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4f269d5f9.pdf (last visited 1 August 2015). Also see Sangiovanni, A., 
‘Solidarity in the European Union’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2013) 1 ff; McDonnell, A., 
‘Solidarity, Flexibility, and the Euro-Crisis: Where Do Principles Fit In?, in: L.S. Rossi & F. Casolari 
(Eds.), The EU after Lisbon Amending or Coping with the Existing Treaties?.(Cham: Springer, 2014), 
p. 84. 
18 See Joint Cases 6 & 11/69 Commission v France [1969] ECR 523, para 16. 
19 The expression of the principle of solidarity evoked in the Schuman Declaration/Plan in 1951 can 
be found in the principle of sincere cooperation and loyalty (Articles 86 ECSC, 5 ECC (then Article 10 
EC) AND 192 ECSC), available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/ basic-information/symbols/europe-
day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm (last visited 18 June 2016). 
20 Art. 2 TEC. 
21 For further detail on this point see Thielemann 2003, note 14, at p. 260. 
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policy. Article 63 (2) (b) TEC contemplated the possibility that the Council could 
introduce measures to ‘promot[e] a balance of effort between Member States in 
receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced 
persons’. 
 In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty enriched the acquis communautaire of the EU 
through many references to solidarity, including:22 
 
 Within the different objectives of Union policies: Article 3 (3) TEU promotes 
solidarity between ‘generations’ and economic, social and territorial cohesion 
‘among Member States’; and Article 3 (5) TEU refers to ‘solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples’ in the EU’s dealings with the wider world. 
 Article 2 TEU cites solidarity as one of the elements that characterizes the 
Member States’ society, along with other common values such as respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights. 
 Within the principle of sincere cooperation:23 solidarity is implied in the 
requirement that ‘the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual 
respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties’ 
(Article 4 (3) TEU). While loyalty ‘is an enforceable, primarily vertically 
directed principle, solidarity is rather [a] political [one]’.24 
 Article 21 (1) TEU states that solidarity is one of the guiding principles that 
inspired the Union’s creation and upon which its external action should be 
grounded. The EU foreign and security policy is, therefore, based on the 
‘development of mutual political solidarity among Member States’ (Article 24 
(2) TEU).25 
 In regard to the mechanism of abstention in a vote, Article 31 (1) TEU states 
that ‘in a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State shall refrain from any 
action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision 
and the other Member States shall respect its position.’ 
 Article 222 TFEU, which is entitled ‘solidarity clause’, refers to the ‘spirit of 
solidarity’ in relation to joint actions between the Union and its Member 
States in the event of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. 
 The EU Charter of fundamental rights, which has the nature of primary law, 
refers to the principle of solidarity in Chapter IV.26 
                                                          
22 See on this point Thielemann 2003, note 14; Morgese 2014, note 16, at p. 371; Sangiovanni 2013, 
note 17, pp. 1 ff. 
23 For further discussion on the principle of loyalty see Klamert, M., The Principle of Loyalty in EU 
Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
24 Ibid., pp. 298–299. 
25 For further detail see Keukeleire, S. & T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union 
(London: Palgrave, 2014), p. 158. 
26 The rights contained are workers’ rights, protection of family and professional life, access to social 
security and social assistance, health care, access to services of general economic interest, 
environmental protection and consumer protection (Arts. 27–38). In relation to the nature of the 
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Thus, solidarity is enshrined in the very essence of EU law. 
 
3 The Role of Solidarity in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AfSJ) 
 
Provisions relating to freedom, security and justice reiterate the solidarity 
concept as the inspiring principle of common policy on border checks, asylum and 
immigration. Article 67 TFEU urges, as suggested by the language therein 
(‘ensure’ and ‘endeavour’), the Union to ‘frame a common policy on asylum, 
immigration and external border control, based on solidarity between Member 
States, which is fair towards third-country nationals.’ The solidarity concept, as 
stipulated in Article 67 TFEU, refers to Member States in their reciprocal 
relationship but does not mention solidarity towards third-country nationals, who 
are considered to be the beneficiaries of a ‘fair’ policy. 
 Then, Article 80 TFEU explicitly states that Union policies on border checks, 
asylum and immigration shall ‘be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member 
States’. The language suggests different forms of solidarity, including the 
provision of financial support for heavily burdened Member States.27 The Article 
justifies Union institutions’ measures of solidarity and burden sharing.28 It is 
noteworthy that for the first time the two terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘responsibility’ 
are mentioned together in the same Article, suggesting that these two concepts 
are interconnected. It is hereby argued that the fair sharing of responsibility, i.e. 
burden sharing29 between Member States, is a direct con- sequence of solidarity, 
while the latter is the motivation for burden-sharing.30 Together they are the 
constitutive elements of a single principle applicable in this area.31 
 In addition to primary law, many pieces of secondary legislation also establish 
commitments of mutual support amongst Member States, for example the 
Temporary Protection Directive, Frontex Regulation, European Asylum Support 
                                                                                                                                                   
rights contained in this chapter, see A.G. Trstenjak Opinion, 8 September 2011, Case C-282/10, 
Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la région 
Centre, para 76, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=109267&pageIndex=0&doclang
=en&m ode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=39339 (last visited 14 October 2016). 
27 This type of solidarity manifests in the European Refugee Fund established in Council Decision 
2000/596/EC, of 28 September 2000, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home- 
affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/refugee-fund/index_en.htm (last visited 18 
June 2016). 
28 Peers, S., ‘Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and Decision- Making in 
the Treaty of Lisbon’, 10(2) European Journal of Migration and Law (2008) pp. 219 ff, at 236. 
29 Thielemann 2003, note 14, pp. 253 ff. 
30 See on this point Mason, A., Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and their 
Normative Significance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
31 Morgese 2014, note 16, p. 373. 
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Office (EASO) Regulations, European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) and more 
recently, the Council Regulation on the provision of emergency support within the 
Union.32 An entire chapter in the Temporary Protection Directive has been 
devoted to the principle of solidarity, which details how ‘soft’ solidarity 
mechanisms can facilitate an equitable distribution between Member States in 
the case of a ‘mass influx’.33 Yet, this directive, grounded in Article 78 (2)(c), has 
never been applied.34 
 More importantly, since 2013, new asylum rules have been established to set 
out ‘common high standards and stronger co-operation to ensure that asylum 
seekers are treated equally in an open and fair system’.35 As part of the European 
Agenda on Migration,36 ‘in a spirit of solidarity, the EU has proposed three lines of 
intervention to tackle the massive migratory flows: 1) redistribution mechanisms 
between Member States, 2) targeting criminal smuggling networks, and 3) 
strengthening Frontex’s role and capacity.’37 
 Subsequently, specific mechanisms,38 including a set of measures to manage 
                                                          
32 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary 
protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance 
of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the con- sequences 
thereof, OJ L 212/12, 7 August 2001 (Temporary Protection Directive); Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, L349/1 (Frontex 
Regulation); Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 
2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office, L132/11 (EASO Regulation), supported 
respectively by Articles 77(1)(b), (c); and 78(1), (2). Both regulations also draw on Article 74; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity 
Fund, OJ L 311, 14/11/2002 p.3–8; Council Regulation 6977/16 on the provision of emergency 
support within the Union on the provision of emergency support within the Union of 9th March 
2016, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6977 
-2016-INIT/en/pdf (last visited 25 October 2016). 
33 See Ibid., Chapter VI of the Temporary Directive. 
34 Matera, C. and A. Taylor, The Common European Asylum System and Human Rights: enhancing 
protection in times of emergencies, Working Papers 2014/7 (The Hague: Centre for the Law of EU 
External Relations (CLEER), 2014), p. 13, available at http://www.asser.nl/ media/2485/cleer14-
7_web.pdf (last visited 14 December 2016). 
35 The rules introduced in 2013 are available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what- we-
do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm (last visited 5 August 2016). 
36 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on 
Migration (COM (2015) 240 final). European Commission, European Agenda on Migration—
Legislative documents (Brussels: European Commission, 2015), available   at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda 
-migration/proposal-implementation-package/index_en.htm (last visited 20 May 2016). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Such as the EU humanitarian admission scheme with Turkey for refugees from Syria, see C 9490 
Commission Recommendation of 15.12.2015 for a voluntary humanitarian admission scheme with 
Turkey (2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we- do/policies/securing-
eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/commission_recommendation_ 
for_a_voluntary_humanitarian_admission_scheme_with_turkey_en.pdf  (last  visited 5 August 
2016); or for the relocation system see footnote 43. 
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the EU’s external borders and protect the Schengen area,39 have been introduced 
together with a European Border and Coast Guard,40 and systematic database 
checks for all people entering and exiting the Schengen zone.41 To complement 
the Dublin system with mechanisms benefiting Member States confronted with 
an emergency situation due to a sudden influx of third-country nationals, the 
Council of the EU issued two decisions on relocation,42 based on Article 78 (3) 
TFEU.43 
 
4 Solidarity and Responsibility: The New Dublin IV 
 
One of the factors that exacerbates the humanitarian repercussions of the current 
refugee crisis relates to the rules for determining the country responsible for 
asylum applications.44 The Dublin system was never intended as a burden- sharing 
                                                          
39 See EU-Turkey joint action plan, Brussels, 15 October 2015, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm (last visited 13 September 2017) 
Brussels (2015). This proposal has been criticized by academics for doing ‘too much in the area of 
border controls (where the Frontex proposal exceeds EU powers and is politically unprincipled) and 
too little in the area of asylum (since there is no significant attempt to address humanitarian or 
protection needs within the EU)’. Also, the most affected Member States have been sceptical 
towards the idea of having European Border and Coast Guards controlling their own territories 
without their consent. See Peers, S., The Reform of Frontex: Saving Schengen at Refugees’ Expense? 
(EU Law Analysis, 2015), available at http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-281-frontex-
schengen-refugees.pdf at p. 1. (last visited 29 May 2016). 
40 On 6 October 2016, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was officially launched. See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3281_en.htm (last visited 14 December 2016). 
41 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation No 
562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant data- bases at external 
border, COM(2015) 670 final 2015/0307 (COD) of 15.12.2015. An agreement was reached on 5th 
December 2016 by the European Parliament and the Council. See further details at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-4273_en.htm (last visited 14 December 
2016). 
42 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, p. 146; 
Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ L 248/80, 22.9.2015 p. 80. 
43 The Article was never used before, despite the competence having been conferred to the Council 
since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). The Lisbon Treaty only added the need to consult the 
European Parliament before the adoption of such measures. For further detail on this see 
Groenendijk, K. & B. Nagy, Hungary’s appeal against relocation to the CJEU: upfront attack or rear 
guard battle? (Brussels: Odysseus Network, December 2015), available at 
http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/hungarys-appeal-against-relocation-to-the-cjeu-upfront-attack-or-
rear-guard-battle/ (last visited 21 January 2016). 
44 Amnesty International, Greece: Briefing on the Draft Law on Asylum, Migration-Related Detention 
and Returns of Third Country Nationals (London: AI, 2011); UNHCR, Asylum Situation in Greece 
Including for Dublin II Transferees (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011); UNHCR, Oral Submissions in Joined 
Cases of NS (C-411/10) and ME and Others (C-493/10), 2011; see also McDonough, P. & E. Tsourdi, 
‘The “Other” Greek Crisis: Asylum and EU Solidarity’, 4 Refugee Survey Quarterly (2012), pp. 67 ff, at 
p. 70. 
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mechanism of solidarity.45 It aimed to identify the Member State responsible for 
processing an asylum application on the basis of providing effective access to 
international protection.46 Consequently, a limited number of individual Member 
States ‘had to deal with the vast majority of asylum seekers arriving in the Union, 
putting the capacities of their asylum systems under strain and leading to some 
disregard of EU rules’.47 The Commission in its Dublin reform proposal (Dublin 
IV),48 which is under review at the time of writing, states that ‘the Dublin system 
must be reformed, both to simplify it and enhance its effectiveness in practice, 
and to be equal to the task of dealing with situations when Member States’ 
asylum systems are faced with disproportionate pressure’.49 It then proposes a 
mechanism ‘to ensure fair sharing of responsibilities between Member States by 
complementing the current system with a corrective allocation mechanism.50 This 
mechanism would be activated automatically in cases where Member States 
would have to deal with a disproportionate number of asylum seekers.’51 
 Yet, the Dublin system is still ‘ineffective and inefficient, inflicts hardship on 
protection seekers and damages the efficiency of the CEAS’.52 Like its 
predecessors,53 the new Dublin IV Proposal still maintains that the country 
                                                          
45 Communication ‘Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System and enhancing legal 
avenues to Europe’ of 6 April 2016, COM (2016) 197 final. 
46 See Preamble No. 5 Regulation 604/2013/ EU (Dublin III), supra note 7. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third country 
national or a stateless person (recast), Brussels, 4.5.2016 COM(2016) 270 final 2016/0133 (COD), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/ european-agenda-
migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160504/dublin_ reform_proposal_en.pdf (last 
visited 28 October 2016), the so-called Dublin IV. 
49 Ibid., at p. 4. 
50 The corrective mechanism would have the same function as the ‘crisis relocation mechanism’. For 
further detail about the system see, Maiani, F., The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation Study 
(Brussels: Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2016), pp. 33 ff, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses (last visited 13 December 2016). 
51 For a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the corrective allocation mech- anism, 
see Guild, E., Costello, C. & Moreno-Lax, V., Implementation of the 2015 Council Decisions 
Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and 
of Greece (Brussels: European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, 2017), p. 63. 
52 CEAS is an abbreviation for the Common European Asylum System. See Maiani 2016, note 50 at p. 
6. 
53 The Default Dublin rule was originally introduced by the 1990 Dublin Convention, an inter-
governmental agreement between Member States, that replaced the Schengen rules and 
established that asylum applications had to be processed in the EU country of arrival. In 1999, 
following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Schengen acquis was integrated into 
the European Union framework, conferring competence to the EU institutions to enact legislation in 
this area. In 2003, the Dublin II Regulation re- placed the 1990 Dublin Convention clarifying the 
criteria for determining responsibility. This Regulation was subsequently repealed by the Dublin III 
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responsible for processing an application shall be the first country where an 
asylum application is made. This system makes it possible to determine swiftly the 
responsible Member State.54 However, such a mechanism has increased 
asymmetry between Member States. The frontline countries at the EU’s external 
borders, such as Greece, Italy, Malta and the EU Balkan Member States, are the 
most susceptible to migratory flows and also among the least wealthy countries.55 
For example, Greece has been overburdened with mixed flows of migrants for 
years; its reception conditions are extremely poor and the country is suffering 
from both a financial and economic crisis.56 A similar situation is found in Italy and 
Malta, countries which have been subject to migratory flows from the 
Mediterranean. More recently, a large number of migrants have fled from Syria to 
the Balkans.57 
 In line with the principle of solidarity, an equitable distribution58 based on 
factors considering country sizes, economic capacities and other criteria is 
evidently far more appropriate, as the geographical proximity principle cannot be 
the best way to determine which states should shoulder responsibility. A 
fundamental reform of the CEAS’s responsibility allocation system is necessary, as 
to criticism has also been made of the new corrective allocation mechanism 
included in Dublin IV.59 
 Another problem refers to the fact that Member States, all respecting the 
principle of non-refoulement,60 ‘are considered … safe countries for third-country 
nationals.’61 Nevertheless, significant differences in domestic asylum systems, for 
example in terms of reception conditions, are present within the EU.62 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Regulation, which requires that the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum 
application is, in principle, the first country where an application is made. 
54 See Preamble No. 5 Regulation 604/2013/ EU (Dublin III), supra note 7. 
55 See Nicoletti, M., ‘After Dublin—the urgent need for a real European asylum system (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe, 2014), at p. 9, available at http://website-pace.net/ 
documents/19863/1278654/20150909-AfterDublin-EN.pdf/755eb5b6-3bd1-4d99-af22 
-0b18fdb5a513 (last visited 4 July 2017). 
56 M.S.S v Belgium and Greece, App no 30696/09 ECtHR, 21 January 2011; Joined Cases C-411/10 
and C-493/10, N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. and Others v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] ECR I-13905. 
57 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34131911 (last visited 29 May 2016). 
58 Ibid., at p. 12. 
59 Ibid., and see also Maiaini 2016, note 50, pp. 33 ff. 
60 The principle of non-refoulement protects refugees from being returned to places where they are 
likely to face persecution or suffer torture; and is, indeed, a milestone in both international and EU 
refugee law. See Goodwin-Gill, G., The Refugee in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996) p. 117. 
61 See Preamble no.3 Regulation 604/2013/ EU (Dublin III), supra note 7. 
62 Reception conditions for asylum seekers and the system in place for processing applications for 
international protection are notoriously poor in Greece. See M.S.S., N.S. and M.E. cases, supra note 
56. Since the M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece and the N.S. and M.E. v UK cases, Member States have 
ceased carrying out Dublin transfers in cases where Greece was the country of arrival. The European 
Court of Human Rights, in the M.S.S. case, has held that states that return asylum seekers to Greece 
are in breach of the prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court of 
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absolute presumption that all Member States are ‘safe countries’ has created 
dysfunctions in the system.63 This presumption is based on the mutual trust 
principle between Member States, which implies that they assume that the 
quality and enforcement of each other’s laws is in adherence to shared minimum 
standards of protection and international obligations.64 Indeed, since 2011, 
dysfunctions in the Dublin system have been highlighted first by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and then by the Court of Justice of the EU.65 The 
CJEU has acknowledged the necessity of allowing exceptions to the mutual trust 
principle between EU Member States, setting a high threshold to ‘rebut trust’ by 
establishing the criterion of ‘systemic deficiencies’.66 This problem is due to 
disparities between Member States’ asylum systems.67 The new Dublin IV 
Proposal contains some good suggestions in  relation to replacing some of the 
directives with regulations to achieve greater harmonisation between EU 
countries.68 
 The current common policy on asylum, immigration and external border 
control is therefore not in line with the concept of solidarity as set out in Articles 
67 and 80 TFEU.69 The EU has attempted to intervene in support of Dublin, 
primarily establishing a system of relocation, then offering financial support to 
the affected countries and proposing the 2016 Commission’s New Package of 
Reforms of CEAS.70 
 Aiming at the redistribution of responsibility, the Relocation Decisions evoke 
                                                                                                                                                   
Justice of the European Union in the N.S. and M.E. case confirmed the systemic deficiencies in the 
asylum procedure and reception conditions of asylum seekers in Greece. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See for example cases Gözütok and Brügge, C-187/01 and C-385/01, para 33, where the CJEU in 
relation to the ne bis in idem principle in criminal law clearly states that Member States should 
observe the principle of ‘mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of them 
recognizes the criminal law in force in the other Member States even when the outcome would be 
different if its own national law were applied’. 
For an academic discussion on the principle see Möstl, M., ‘Preconditions and Limits of Mutual 
Recognition’, 47 CML Rev. (2010) pp. 405–436; Brouwer, E., ‘Mutual Trust and the Dublin 
Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of Proof’, 9 Utrecht Law 
Review (2013) 135–147, at 138; Velluti, S., ‘Who has the right to have rights? The judgments of the 
CJEU and ECtHR as building blocks for a European ‘ius commune’ in asylum law’, in: S. Morano-Foadi 
& L. Vickers (eds.), Fundamental Rights: A Matter for Two Courts, Modern Studies in European Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), pp. 131–149. 
65 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, supra note 56; N.S. and M.E. v. UK (Secretary of State), supra 
note 56, para 83. 
66 Ibid., N.S. and M.E. v UK, at para 83. 
67 ECRE, Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered 
(Brussels: ECRE, 2008), p. 14. 
68 See Communication ‘Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System and enhancing 
legal avenues to Europe’ of 6 April 2016, COM (2016) 197 final, at p. 6. 
69 See Dublin Regulation (supra note 5) which places the burden of vetting, feeding, housing, 
granting refugee or asylum status and a job within 9 months to the first country where the refugee 
sets foot in EU territory. 
70 See Communication 197 final, supra note 68. 
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solidarity between Member States. Their aim is for protection seekers to be 
relocated from the country of arrival to other Member States, on the condition 
that migrants would be subject to compulsory fingerprinting. The relocation 
mechanism would apply only to Syrians, Eritreans and Iraqis who are considered 
prima facie refugees ‘in clear need of protection’.71 Beneficiary countries (e.g. 
Italy and Greece) are required to set up and operationalize the so-called hotspots, 
which are structured border zones where national authorities are responsible for 
the identification, registration and fingerprinting of asylum seekers. 
 Although these measures have attempted to move beyond rhetoric,72 thereby 
offering a solution to the present migratory crisis,73 they have been heavily 
criticised as weak instruments induced by emergency logics.74 The Commission is 
concerned about the speed of the process, which is slow and inefficient mainly 
because of a lack of political will75 from the beneficiary and the relocating 
countries.76 In particular, in its third implementation report, the Commission 
introduced recommendations to improve the relocation schemes and urged 
Member States to comply fully with their obligations under the Relocation 
Decisions.77 Unfortunately, the CEAS as a whole, which includes mandatory 
relocation mechanisms, is struggling to thrive.78 The mandatory mechanisms are 
                                                          
71 Regulation (EU) 603/2013 on the establishment of Eurodac for the comparison of fingerprints for 
the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third- country national or a stateless person 
and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement 
authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT 
systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast) OJEU L 180, 26.6.2013, pp. 1–30. 
72 Decision (EU) 2015/1523 and Decision (EU) 2015/1601, supra note 42. 
73 Owing to the large numbers involved, the system pertains only to Syrian, Eritrean and Iraqi 
migrants who are applying for international protection and entering the EU through Italy or Greece 
for a period of 24 months. The scheme aims to relocate 160,000 people in clear need of 
international protection. In addition to this scheme there is also an EU resettlement scheme for 
20,000 people in need of international protection. This voluntary scheme was adopted to show 
solidarity towards third countries in North Africa, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa that are 
equally affected. 
74 See Matera & Taylor 2014, note 34, at p. 13. 
75 Hungary and Slovakia have challenged Decision (EU) 2015/1601. However, on 6th September 
2017 the Court of Justice of the EU has rejected their challenge. Moreover, the migratory pressure 
on Sweden and Austria has led these two Member States to request suspension of their obligations 
under the Council Decisions on relocation. Austria has been given temporary suspension for one 
year, see European Commission, COM (2016) 165 final, Brussels, 16.3.2016, p. 3. In relation to 
Sweden, the one-year suspension from re-location has expired in June 2017. 
76 See Maiani 2016, note 50. 
77 The European Commission has evaluated both the relocation and the resettlement schemes. See 
European Commission, Communication Brussels, 18.5.2016 COM(2016) 360 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european- agenda-migration/proposal-
implementation-package/docs/20160518/communication_ 
third_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf  (last visited 3 June 2016). 
78 The two Council relocation decisions are based on Article 78(3) TFEU, which states ‘In the event of 
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now compulsory (they used to be voluntary)79 and have attracted criticisms from 
some Member States.80 However, direct actions against Decision (EU) 
2015/16018181 on relocation have been rejected by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.82 
 
5 EU Financial Solidarity towards Member States 
 
On 19 February 2016, Council Regulation 6977/16 was introduced to provide 
humanitarian assistance internally in support of countries which face large 
numbers of refugees and migrants. Based on Article 122(1) TFEU, the Regulation 
introduced Union emergency provisions.83 In its preamble, it states ‘mutual 
assistance and support in the face of disasters is both a fundamental expression 
of the universal value of solidarity between people and a moral imperative, as 
such disasters may lead to a significant number of people being unable to meet 
their basic needs, with potentially severe adverse effects on their health and 
lives.’84 Then, whilst referring to the current migration and refugee situation, the 
Regulation describes it as ‘a notable example of a situation where, despite the 
efforts undertaken by the Union to address the root causes located in third 
countries, the economic situation of Member States may be directly affected’.85  
 Thus, the EU has timidly attempted to show solidarity towards the affected 
Member States by introducing an appropriate instrument available at Union level 
to address the humanitarian needs of disaster-stricken people within the Union.86 
Previously, the Union was in a position to grant support of a macro-financial 
nature to Member States, expressing European solidarity to disaster-stricken 
regions through the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), but there was no 
                                                                                                                                                   
one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterized by a sudden 
inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt 
provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting 
the European Parliament.’ 
79 The first one, Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015, is voluntary and the 
second, Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015, is mandatory, see supra note 42 for 
full reference. 
80 The V4 Group meeting, available at https://sputniknews.com/politics/201610151046375 999–v4–
migrant-crisis-solidarity/; this refers to a meeting held in September 2016 in Bratislava by the V4 
Group, which comprises the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, to oppose the 
implementation of the mandatory EU quota scheme to relocate refugees. 
81 See Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601, supra note 42. 
82 See Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European 
Union [2017] ECR I-631. 
83 See Council Regulation 6977/16, supra note 32 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Mutual assistance could also be offered under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism pursuant to 
the European Parliament and Council Decision No 1313/2013/EU of 17 December 2013 on a Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 924). However, the operation of that 
Mechanism is based on voluntary contributions from Member States. 
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specific instrument to provide assistance and resources, such as food, emergency 
healthcare, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, protection and education, to 
the affected people. Existing Union policies, such as those which aim at 
establishing an area of freedom, security and justice in the Union, are accessory 
and ancillary to the pursuit of the principal policy objectives of those instruments 
and, therefore, limited in scope and scale. 
 The EU is currently showing solidarity towards Member States in need, 
offering humanitarian ‘emergency support’. However, more support is needed. 
Solidarity schemes to the benefit of affected countries to compensate for the 
asylum costs, which asymmetrically impact on national budget,87 should be 
allocated on a regular basis (they have temporarily been included in the 
Relocation Decisions). This would reiterate the EU’s commitment towards the 
collective good and reinstate Member States’ trust in solidarity.88 EU funding 
under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and other financial 
incentives in support of EU-sponsored allocation or relocation schemes should 
also be intensified. It is now Member States’ turn to commit to solidarity and 
responsibility. 
 Disagreement and contrasting attitudes between the EU’s actions and State 
practices are clear signs of the different perceptions of the principle by individual 
Member States.89 Faith in solidarity/responsibility needs to be restored as Europe 
needs to focus more on its founding values to advance integration. 
Notwithstanding the fact that national contributions have proved insufficient to 
avert or alleviate the migrant crisis, States are still reluctant to exercise ‘solidarity’ 
towards migrants, fellow countries or the whole of the EU. Unilateral measures 
from transit and destination States, such as temporary suspension of the 
application of the Schengen Agreement, and building walls or fences at their 
internal borders have been introduced.90 Despite the legal obligation explicitly 
grounded in the aforementioned Treaty articles and secondary legislation on 
asylum, immigration and external border control, Member States appear not to 
adhere to the principle of solidarity. Even if the concept was deemed to have legal 
connotations, the principle is not sufficiently enforced, especially in relation to 
mass flows. While the principle is frequently referenced in relevant laws, it lacks 
the necessary implementing provisions that would translate it from a general 
principle to legally enforceable obligations. This work aims at reframing solidarity 
                                                          
87 See Maiani 2016, note 50, p. 8. 
88 Ibid. 
89 See in this regard: Raspotnik, A., M. Jacob & L. Ventura, The Issue Of Solidarity In The European 
Union, Discussion Paper at the TEPSA Pre-Presidency Conference 14–15 June 2012 (Brussels: 
European Commission, 2012); Turksen, U., ‘Euro-Vision of Energy Trade with Russia: Current 
Problems and Future Prospects for EU Solidarity in Energy Trade’, 4 OGEL (2014). 
90 For further detail see Weyembergh, A., C. Brière, H. Labayle, P. De Bruycker & D. Watt, The Paris 
Terrorist Attacks: Failure of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? (Brussels: Odysseus 
Network OMNIA Project, 2016), available at http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-paris-terrorist-
attacks-failure-of-the-eus-area-of-freedom-security-and-justice/ (last visited 21 January 2016). 
  16 
and responsibility at the referential centre for discussion and action, recognising 
the need to shift focus from transient and short-sighted economic arguments to 
long-term arguments based on fundamental principles as paramount to resolving 
the current impasse in European integration. 
 
6.  The Role of the Member State: Commitment to Solidarity/Responsibility 
 
The implementation of policies on border checks, asylum and immigration, as 
stated in Article 80 TFEU, cannot be attained without the application of the 
‘principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility’ between Member States. 
Having stressed the legal nature of solidarity and its practical constraints, this 
paper turns now to examine Member State commitments to responsibility, 
starting from the assumption that ‘any solidarity act has a counter-part element 
of responsibility [….] solidarity only grows stronger with consequent 
responsibility’.91 
 Member State solidarity/responsibilities can be structured into three inter- 
connected categories in the area of asylum and immigration. The first, which is 
their legal solidarity/responsibility towards refugees and migrants, is briefly 
considered in this paper. The second is Member State legal 
solidarity/responsibility towards fellow EU countries, which implies its distribution 
amongst States, which can be executed in accordance with the legal term of ‘fair 
sharing’. The third one is their solidarity/responsibility towards the EU as an 
integral entity, which finds its legal foundation in the ‘sincere cooperation’ 
principle. 
 
6.1 Member State Solidarity/Responsibility towards Refugees and Migrants 
 
The legal treatment of refugees and people in need of international protection is 
different from that of migrants fleeing poverty or famine; the latter are 
considered ‘economic migrants’. This distinction is enshrined in Article 1 (A)(2) of 
the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as 
amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, which defines a 
refugee(for the purposes of the Convention) as a person who fears being 
persecuted in their home country.92 Thus, States differentiate their responsibility 
                                                          
91 Vignon, J., Solidarity and Responsibility in the European Union, Notre Europe Policy Brief, No. 26 
(Brussels: European Commission, 2011), available at 
http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/bref27_jvignon_en.pdf?pdf=ok (last visited 23 November 
2016). 
92 Article 1 (A)(2) provides that the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who ‘owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having 
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’ UNTS 150. 
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towards migrants depending on how they define refugees, which often depends 
on the parameters that they place around the concept of a ‘well-founded fear of 
persecution’.93 
 The aims of the Refugee Convention and of EU law (such as the Qualification 
directive and the re-cast directive)94 are, firstly, to ensure that States apply a 
common approach in how they identify persons who are in need of protection, 
and secondly, to ensure that States provide a minimum standard of protection to 
such persons.95 This so-called surrogate protection is meant to come into place 
only in situations when that protection is otherwise unavailable.96 States 
therefore have a legal responsibility to accept refugees when adequate protection 
is not afforded by their home State,97 which has a primary duty to protect its 
citizens.98 Although it must be clearly stated that there is a major difference 
between the legal significance of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which has been 
ratified and applied by 145 countries99 for over 50 years, and the EU secondary 
law that applies within the EU and can be more easily amended. 
 While not a source of legal obligations, the international doctrine of 
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) can be considered as a framework around which 
responses to international migratory pressures can be shaped, especially where 
mass migration results from humanitarian crises. R2P was developed in response 
to humanitarian tragedies towards the end of the 20th century100 and is based on 
a theory of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, whereby a State’s sovereignty is not 
viewed as absolute, but rather premised on the provision of adequate protection 
for its citizens.101 Thus, when protection is not available domestically, the 
                                                          
93 For example, see Jung on the extension of refugee status to persons fearing persecution due to 
their sexual orientation and the assumptions that are made in assessments of genuine need in such 
cases. Jung, M., ‘Logics of Citizenship and Violence of Rights: The Queer Migrant Body and the 
Asylum System’, 3(2) Birkbeck L Rev (2015) pp. 305–335. 
94 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted, OJ L 304 (Qualification 
Directive); Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (Recast Qualification Directive) 
OJ L 337. 
95 Ibid., Council Directive 2004/83/EC, preamble, para 6. 
96 In Canada (Attorney-General) v Ward (1993) 103 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 12; Lord Keith of Kinkel observed 
in Reg. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] A.C. 958, 992H-
993A. 
97 Horvath [2001] 1 AC 489 at pp. 499–500. 
98 Horvath [2001] 1 AC 489 at pp. 499–500, per Lord Hope; Gibney, M.J., ‘Liberal Democratic States 
and Responsibilities to Refugees’, 93 American Political Science Review (1999) 169– 181, at 175; 
Shacknove, A.E., ‘Who is a Refugee?’, 95 Ethics (1985) pp. 274–84, at p. 275. 
99 As of 28 June 2017, available at http://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html. 
100 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to 
Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
101 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1948) 78 UNTS 277, Art. 1; Deng, 
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international community should be available to citizens as a substitute.102 
Originally unanimously endorsed by the UN General Assembly in the context of 
protection against crimes against humanity,103 it has since been suggested that 
the R2P principle should include providing asylum protection for refugees who 
are fleeing such heinous crimes (which would include those fleeing conflict in 
Syria).104 This represents an expansion from mandating humanitarian intervention 
abroad,105 obliging States to allow the impacts of foreign conflicts to cross into 
their own territories, thereby further reformulating the parameters of 
sovereignty. That said, it is necessary to clarify that the main of the obligation to 
protect refugees is not R2P. In fact, it is international refugee law, stemming from 
the 1950 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees106 and 1951 Refugee Convention (as developed by regional law, practice 
and jurisprudence), that offers a set of strong and independent binding norms 
and legal international protection obligations. These instruments predate by 
some five decades the discussions on R2P, which is not, by contrast, accepted as a 
source of law.107 Even though the legal status of R2P in international law is 
arguably a grey area—especially regarding the extent to which States are obliged 
to respond to each other’s failures to protect their own citizens108—it remains a 
valuable concept with regard to injecting a strong sense of solidarity within the 
EU. Indeed, R2P and solidarity may be seen as complementary insofar as the 
former focuses on responsibility towards individuals and the latter is often framed
                                                                                                                                                   
F.M. et al., Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington: Brookings, 1996). See also 
Peters, A., ‘Humanity as the A and Omega of Sovereignty, 20 EJIL (2009) p. 513. 
102 Horvath, [2001] 1 AC 489 at pp. 499–500. 
103 UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/Res/60/1, 
paras. 138–140; Report of the Secretary General on Implementing the responsibility to protect (12 
January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677; Un Security Council Resolution 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc 
S/Res/1674. 
104 Barbour, B., Embracing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: a Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum 
for Potential Victims, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 159, 20 (4) Int J Refugee 
Law (2008) pp. 533–566; Achiume, E.T., ‘Syria, Cost-sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect 
Refugees’, 100(2) Minnesota Law Rev (2015) p. 687; Hadfield A. & A. Zwitter,’ Analyzing the EU 
Refugee Crisis: Humanity, Heritage and Responsibility to Protect’, 3(2) Politics and Governance 
(2015) p. 129; Bellamy, A.J., The Responsibility to Protect and the Migrant Crisis (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), available at https:// protectiongateway.com/2016/04/02/the-responsibility-
to-protect-and-the-migrant-crisis/ (last visited 11 June 2016). 
105 For a critical analysis of the rhetoric of protection in international intervention see Orford, A., 
International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: CUP, 2011). 
106 Available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c39e1.pdf. 
107 Rosenberg, Sheri P., ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention’, 1 Global 
Responsibility to Protect (2009) pp. 442–477, available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect%20A%20Framework%20
For%20 Prevention%20(Rosenberg).pdf. 
108 De Baere, B., ‘The EU and the Responsibility to Protect’, in: B. van Vooren, S. Blockmans & J. 
Wouters (Eds.), The EU’s Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension (Oxford: Oxford university 
Press, 2013). 
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in relation to responsibility towards other States.109 Both approaches are 
necessary for providing effective solutions to the migration crisis.110 While the EU 
has embraced this concept,111 it still has not expressly included it as part of the 
instruments of EU law. However, R2P can be viewed as promoting the 
responsibility of States in relation to refugees, and in harmony with both the 
customary norm of humanitarian assistance for victims in need of surrogate 
protection and the concept of solidarity.112 
 Countries are defending not only their sovereignty by controlling who is 
entering their territory, but are also exacerbating disparities in the burdens on 
their fellow States which are located in more migratory-exposed geographical 
areas. In such instances, States are neglecting both their responsibility to protect 
and their commitments to solidarity. In relation to refugees and people in need of 
international protection and based on the R2P and in line with both customary 
rules and solidarity,113 States should not only offer the protections that they are 
required to under the 1951 Refugee Convention and major regional 
conventions,114 but should also assist States that are facing a disproportionate 
burden from refugee influxes and those refugees that are suffering as a result. 
 By contrast, State’s responsibility/solidarity towards economic migrants or 
migrant workers is controversial. The Convention for the Protection of the Rights 
of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families accords both 
documented/legal and undocumented/illegal migrants with civil, social and 
labour rights.115 However, to date, the Convention has mainly been ratified by 
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developing countries; none of the EU Member States has ratified it.116 A 
fragmented and patchy legal framework regulates legal entry for this category of 
migrants within the EU.117  
 
6.2. Member State Responsibility/Solidarity towards One Another 
 
Responsibility between Member States goes hand in hand with the principle of 
inter-state solidarity within the EU. It also evokes the concept of burden sharing, 
which imposes special responsibilities on States towards one another— 
responsibilities which are greater than those which Member States have towards 
humanity at large. The extent to which States would be inclined to accept 
migrants and refugees depends on how they apply solidarity towards fellow 
countries. Several articles in the EU Treaties refer to this principle, which 
necessitates shared responsibility based on a communitarian principle, i.e. ties 
arising from shared goals, activities, commitments, and common identities and 
history.118 Unfortunately, as noted above, solidarity has faded away as the guiding 
approach, as many Member States have refused to play their part in sharing the 
humanitarian burden of the migration crisis. Some have built walls/fences as part 
of their border control policy and others have refused to comply with the 
mandatory relocation quotas envisaged by the Council.119 This has subsequently 
placed heavy burdens on countries which have adopted an open approach 
towards migrants. This will become an unsustainable burden if it is not shared.120 
The Treaty appears to require Union institutions to govern asylum and 
immigration policies in accordance with the principle of solidarity and the fair 
sharing of responsibility between Member States. 
 The question of how solidarity/responsibility towards other fellow countries 
can be substantiated deserves some consideration based on a normative 
discussion on solidarity and shared responsibility. Commitment to the well-being 
of others can be conceived ‘in terms of the recognition of special obligations 
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between the members of a group, which exist in virtue of their being members of 
it’.121 An example elaborated by Miller about a group of hikers going on a trip in 
the mountains together illustrates the nature of this concept.122 If one of the 
hikers (alias a frontline Member State) falls and is injured ‘it is taken for granted 
that the responsibility for bringing aid to the injured member falls in the first 
place collectively on the whole group rather than on other climbers who happen 
to be in the vicinity at the time.’123 The other members of the groups (the other 
Member States) should distribute the burden depending on their capabilities. 
Each party will have a different role in accordance with financial or non-financial 
indicators. In the case of the hikers, a doctor or nurse fellow would provide first 
aid to the injured party; an athlete would run to the nearest village to ask for 
help; and a security guard would be physically fit to carry the wounded person to 
the nearest hospital. This is grounded in a spirit of cooperation which does not 
imply uniformity, but rather appreciates a diversity of approaches and 
capabilities. Its acceptance stands in the conviction that solidarity is one of the 
foundations of the European Union and a guiding principle governing the 
relationship of Member States with each other. This responsibility is understood 
as a concern for other members of a group.124 Consequently, in the name of a 
common EU mission,125 Member States ought to be allies and share the burden of 
this project. Thus, the main features of this type of commitment are: collective 
agency and motivation. The basis of the latter is mutual trust between 
people/States who share common values.126 Collective agents have shared goals, 
a procedure for selection to become part of the group and display rationality in 
their actions.127 This form of collective agency, which would ideally apply to all 
twenty-eight Member States, has, in reality, been weakened by the way they see 
the EU, i.e. as an instrument to remedy emergencies by protecting national 
interest. This is also shown by the concept of flexible solidarity recently proposed 
by the V4 group countries (i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), 
which advocate the possibility of choosing their own special forms of contribution 
to the migration crisis, taking into account their potential and experience.128  
 Solidarity expresses a ‘horizontal bond of unity’129 between the Member 
States, but to be a ground for infringement or a source of concrete obligations for 
                                                          
121 Thielemann 2003, note 14, at pp. 257–258. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 See supra note 118. 
125 In this connection, see Borg-Barthet, J. & C. Lyons, The European Union migration crisis, 20 Edin 
LR (2016) 230–34, who contended that ‘the horizontal relationship between the member states has 
reverted to traditional notions of absolute territorial sovereignty’. 
126 Miller, D., The Left, the Nation-State and European Citizenship, Dissent, (1998) p. 48. 
127 Sangiovanni 2013, note 17, p. 408. 
128 EU Welcomes V4 Group’s Idea of Flexible Solidarity to Tackle Migrant Crisis (2016), available at 
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201610151046375999–v4–migrant-crisis-solidarity/ (last visited 
23 November 2016. 
129 Klamert 2014, note 23, p. 37. 
  22 
the Member States, it needs to be included in a piece of secondary legislation or 
be linked to Article 4(3) TEU. Consequently, this raises a number of questions on 
the enforceability of solidarity/responsibility: how this type of responsibility can 
be substantiated; what its main features are; whether legal consequences are 
available if and when States refuse to abide by solidarity measures. 
 
6.3 Member State Solidarity/Responsibility towards the EU 
 
The two above-discussed levels of Member States’ solidarity/responsibility, i.e. 
towards refugees and migrants and towards other Member States, have not 
proved to be strong enough to solve the present impasse. This paper suggests an 
ultimate level of solidarity/responsibility, i.e. towards the EU as a whole. The 
introduction of an additional level has the twofold purpose of complementing the 
other two levels and casting the appropriate importance to solidarity and 
responsibility, so as to enable them to fulfil their relevant role for which they have 
been originally designed. The concept is in fact enshrined in Article 4 (3) TEU, 
which ‘has produced some of the strongest “ties that bind” the Member States 
within the European Union’.130 The article confers mutual obligations on the 
Union and the Member States to carry out the tasks arising from the Treaties. 
Thus, both the Union and the Member States are responsible, in mutual respect, 
to perform the duties enshrined in the Treaties. Moreover, it re- quires Member 
States (1) to ensure fulfilment of the obligation arising from the Treaties or 
resulting from the acts of the Union institutions, (2) to facilitate the achievement 
of the Union’s tasks, and (3) to abstain from any contravening measures which 
can jeopardise the Union’s objectives. 
 Three obligations arise from this article. The first is a positive obligation, 
requiring Member States to introduce measures either emanating from the 
Treaties (for example, respecting solidarity as prescribed in Article 67 TFEU) or 
from secondary legislation (for example, enforcing the Council Decisions’ rules on 
relocation).131 The second is also a positive obligation, entailing the facilitation of 
the Union’s tasks, for example, in relation to the creation of an area of freedom, 
security and justice.132 The last one is a negative obligation, which compels 
Member States to refrain from introducing measures that can endanger the 
fulfilment of the Union’s objectives, such as reinstating internal borders within 
the Schengen area.133 
 Thus, solidarity/responsibility towards the European project constitutes a 
‘fixed hegemonic formation’, or a ‘nodal point’,134 which requires conscientious 
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actions from Member States to sustain it. Their responsibility ‘flows from a 
requirement of solidarity’,135 which finds its constitutional basis in the principle of 
loyalty contained in Article 4 (3) TEU. 
 Whether legal consequences are available in cases where States refuse to 
abide by solidarity measures introduced via legislative measures, enforcement 
instruments are left to the discretion of the Commission, in accordance with 
Articles 256–258 TFEU, as the enforcer of the Treaty. The extent to which Article 4 
(3) TEU can be evoked in some of these circumstances is developed in the 
following section. 
 
7 Emergency and Crisis: The Intertwined Principles of Solidarity and 
Loyalty 
 
What is relevant for the purpose of this discussion is that cooperation between 
the Union and Member States denotes a process, and a relationship between 
different actors, which implies duties of mutual assistance amongst Member 
States and with the EU as a whole. The crucial point is the conviction that the 
adoption of unilateral measures, such as internal border controls, disrupts 
solidarity and undermines the foundations of the whole EU project. Unilateral 
Member State practices can destabilize the principle of solidarity and strengthen 
individual self-interest rather than collective good. Consequently, particularly in 
periods of emergency or crisis, unilateral actions carry scattered effects and 
ascribe to Member States the direct responsibility for the disintegration of the 
Union. In general, the issue of border control, be it internal borders be- tween 
Member States or external borders at the frontiers of Europe, is problematic in a 
humanitarian crisis, as it suggests a quasi-military model of border enforcement 
which does not support the commitment to European values. 
 The connubial solidarity/responsibility towards the Union, as an entity, and as 
an agreement which has bound together States and people,136 presents a means 
of protecting the collective interest and precludes unilateral Member State 
actions that might jeopardize the entire project. The crux, therefore, is the 
question of how to make Member States, for example, enacting refugee 
relocation mechanisms introduced by the institutions or how to reinstate 
Schengen in order to fulfil their obligations towards the Union. The current 
migratory phenomenon, coupled with recent financial crisis, has produced a 
certain degree of distrust regarding the welfare state itself as well as a common 
ground for solidarity. Parts of the European discourse on solidarity contradicts 
individualism and the economic self-interest of the Members States in favour of 
collective actions. Yet the richest trading bloc in the world is under threat because 
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of ‘the creation of a climate of fear, hostility, and resentment that precludes the 
search for a more creative, humane, and imaginative responses to complex 
challenges of the twenty-first-century migration’.137 Politicians, the media and the 
public are all responsible for such tensions. Political responses are essential to 
turn the powerful legal aspects of responsibility and solidarity into practical 
reality. Yet the current situation shows disunity between Member States, lack of 
mutual trust between them, disillusion towards the common European project 
and concerns on the issue of security.138 
 Ownership of responsibility is a key element because the lack of real 
commitment from Member States towards the Union, which was intended as an 
organization and collectivity of people, makes legal obligations a dead letter if 
they are not properly applied; they become ‘paper tigers, fierce in appearance 
but missing in tooth and claw’.139 Yet, the TFEU in relation to the Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) expressly recognises a ‘spirit’ of solidarity that should 
pave the way to frame and carry out policies in the AFSJ (Article 67 TFEU), 
especially in regard to border checks, asylum, and immigration (Article 80 TFEU). 
When unilateral action by a Member State, violates EU Law, the principles of 
solidarity and loyalty to the EU are intrinsically connected. 
 The CJEU in the 1969 Commission v France case stated that ‘solidarity […] is at 
the basis […] of the whole of the Community system in accordance with the 
undertaking provided for in Article 5 of the [EEC] Treaty [now Article 4(3) TEU, i.e. 
the Loyalty Clause]’.140 Solidarity and loyalty must be conceived of as two sides of 
the same coin, which favour common general interest over the national interests 
of Member States.141 
 In the Commission v Italy case the Court referred to a ‘duty of solidarity 
accepted by Member States by the fact of their adherence to the Community’.142 
Thus, solidarity is essential for the ‘equilibrium between advantages and 
obligations owing from [a Member State’s] adherence to the Community’.143 It is 
this principle that prohibits Member States from pursuing purely national 
interest, if they compromise the interests of the Union. Member States are barred 
from acting unilaterally when their action or inaction disturb this equilibrium.144 
However, the ground for infringement as a source of concrete obligations for the 
Member States per se, needs to be included either in a piece of secondary 
                                                          
137 Carr 2015, note 6, p. 286. 
138 Terror attacks in Europe, which have been almost daily in recent months, will continue. See  
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/07/26/analysis-string-if-terror-attacks-europe-
likely-continue/87578584/ (last visited 2 August 2016). 
139 Hepple, B., Social and Labour Rights in a Global Perspective (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p. 238. 
140 Joined Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission of the European’ Communities v France, supra 
footnote 19, para 16. 
141 See Casolari 2014, note 15, p. 124. 
142 Case 39/72, Commission v Italy (Premiums for Slaughtering Cows) [1973] ECR 101, para 24. 
143 Ibid. 
144 See Klamert 2014, note 23, at p. 37. 
  25 
legislation or be linked to Article 4(3) TEU.145 
 Indeed, solidarity measures entailing a sharing of responsibility are strongly 
justified in times of crisis for their exceptional nature. 
 In this regard, a clear example of a measure introduced in an emergency 
situation to give effect to the principle of solidarity and shared responsibility, is 
the recent Council Decision 2015/1601 on mandatory relocation, based on Article 
78 (3) TFEU and Article 80 TFEU. The mechanisms conceived in this measure, 
provide (a) solidarity mechanisms in the form of operational support to Italy and 
to Greece to be activated in the event of an emergency situation; (b) financial 
solidarity measures for both Member States receiving more refugees and those 
receiving fewer refugees as a result of the relocation measures;(c) further 
solidarity measures in case of further emergency situation requiring the 
suspension of the participation of a specific Member State in the relocation as 
well as possible compensatory measures for the beneficiary countries. 
 However, when introduced by the EU institutions such measures require a 
Member State’s implementation. Failure to comply with such measures can 
provoke disastrous consequences for all other Member States, and for the Union 
as well. Consequently, if solidarity provisions are not fully implemented by 
Member States—generally as a result of the impasse between sharing burdens 
and giving primacy to national interests—then the loyalty principle may be 
invoked as a ‘gap filler’ between what primary law imposes and those respective 
omissions or actions.146 It follows that lack of implementation of solidarity 
mechanisms can be challenged by interpreting EU legislation in the light of the 
loyalty principle. 
 Also, in N.S.147 the CJEU ensured some degree of solidarity between Member 
States, in requiring them to exercise the discretionary power provided by the 
Dublin Regulation by not transferring an asylum seeker to the Member State 
(Greece). The Court ruled that it would be unreasonable for Member States to 
ignore that the asylum seeker could face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment in the responsible Member State, owing to well-known 
systemic deficiencies in that State’s asylum system. The Court’s rationale 
primarily lies in the need to respect the human rights of asylum seekers, and 
hence the need to ensure the effectiveness of the Charter of fundamental 
rights.148 
 Failing implementation of solidarity measures, the Commission can exercise its 
discretion to enforce secondary legislation to ensure compliance with EU law as 
also reiterated by Article 197 TFEU, which states that the ‘effective 
implementation of Union law by the Member States, which is essential for the 
proper functioning of the Union, shall be regarded as a matter of common 
                                                          
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid., p. 125 
147 See N.S. case, note 56. 
148 Casolari 2014, note 15, p. 125. 
  26 
interest’, derived from Article 4 (3) TEU.149 
 
8         Conclusions 
 
This contribution attempts to prepare a novel bedrock for robust foundations to 
accommodate future solutions in mass migratory emergencies. The seminal 
principle prompting the discourse in the preceding pages is solidarity, 
quintessential to EU law and permeating the whole structure of the Treaty. In 
Union policies on border checks, asylum and immigration, solidarity is expressly 
connected to shared responsibility. The spine of the whole paper, then, is built 
and stretched between the twin poles of solidarity and responsibility. 
 
 The origin of the principle of solidarity can be traced back to the Schuman 
Declaration of 9 May 1950. Its legal connotation, in relation to immigration and 
asylum, is evident in Article 80 TFEU, which relates solidarity to shared 
responsibility. In addition, numerous pieces of secondary legislation evoke the 
very concept in an attempt to apply it to specific actions, such as the relocation of 
refugees across Member States.150 
 This paper is based on the conviction that reaffirming the centrality of the role 
of solidarity and responsibility within the EU is essential, because their function 
has been gradually fading away. Solidarity is ‘not just a factual necessity, but is a 
legal, normative obligation, embedded in EU law’;151 its explicit reaffirmation, 
particularly at times when it is most needed, can solve the current impasse in 
Europe. Together with shared responsibility, this concept should be at the core of 
the Member States and EU migratory agendas, not to defend States’ self-
interests, but in the name of a common European project. The binomial 
solidarity/responsibility should be the basis of a newly founded Europe. A shift of 
focus on these two concepts has the potential to overcome tensions between the 
EU and Member States and to facilitate long-term solutions to emergencies.152 
Rather than being divided by nationalistic ideologies, Member States are called to 
act as a united corpus within the Union, overcoming market and security logics in 
favour of more humanitarian goals.153 
 This paper has suggested orienting the attention of EU and national policy 
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makers, politicians and the public towards a ‘refreshed’ Europe, a Union based on 
forces of integration and compassion. Although the binomial solidarity/ 
responsibility is explicitly recognized in the field of migration,154 still some 
Member States attempt to evade their obligations towards migrants, each other 
and the EU. The need for effective responses to volatile market-based economies 
is difficult to reconcile with these values, which tend to be forgot- ten at times of 
crisis. The legal principle is available but the process of eliciting an EU response to 
the migratory pressure, despite recent developments,155 has been slow, hesitant 
and not too ambitious. Certainly, the concern mainly stands with Member States, 
which clearly seem to prefer peer pressure and consensus-building under the 
open method of co-ordination over binding rules in this area.156 
 This paper submits that a new approach to law-making based on a more 
participative process of integration, which encompasses values such as solidarity 
and responsibility should be adopted. It does not suggest merely introducing soft 
law measures to deal with mass migratory flows, as this would undermine the 
binding effect of EU rules, but to build legislative solidarity actions inspired by 
values. It is compelling to have a stronger united Europe as migratory flows are 
not a one-off phenomenon. The intensity of the current mixed-movements has 
challenged the foundation of Europe, testing the working of the EU and its values. 
The humanitarian crisis is unlikely to stop any time soon as many African and 
Asian countries are destabilized. There will be future flows and this situation is 
likely to persist for the many years to come. Faced with such continuous 
migratory pressure, Member States can either safeguard the Union or trigger its 
disintegration. Recent events have demonstrated that migration cannot be 
controlled in the way some EU Member States would like it to be. Countries 
cannot isolate themselves by building walls, barriers and fences. The Union 
cannot ignore humanitarian responsibilities, fail to protect fundamental human 
rights, and remain a viable international coalition. Failure to respond to such EU 
measures introducing solidarity duties needs to be rectified using enforcement 
procedures available within the EU. However, EU measures should overcome the 
emergency rationale. The logic of solidarity and shared responsibility goes beyond 
emergency, as it is embedded within the EU structural architecture, but under 
current circumstances it should be reaffirmed as fundamental in the area of 
migration. 
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